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What Do We Really Know about 
Changes in Wage Inequality?
Thomas Lemieux
1.1    Introduction
It is very well known that wage and earnings inequality has grown sub-
stantially over the last thirty years. The initial burst of inequality growth in 
the 1980s attracted a lot attention among labor economists. This resulted 
in a set of inﬂ  uential papers published in the early 1990s, in particular Katz 
and Murphy (1992); Bound and Johnson (1992); Levy and Murnane (1992); 
and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). These papers laid down the main 
facts and possible explanations for the dramatic increase in wage inequality 
of the 1980s. At the time, the leading explanation that emerged was based 
on a pervasive increase in the demand for all dimensions of skills that was 
mitigated, in part, by swings in relative supply linked to the baby boom 
cohort. A number of papers later argued that the leading source of increase 
in the relative demand for skills was skill-  biased technological change 
(SBTC) linked, in large part, to the computer and information technology 
revolution.1
Over the last ﬁ  fteen years, however, further research has cast some doubt 
on the basic view that inequality growth is driven by a combination of 
demand changes linked to SBTC and the computer revolution. This “revi-
sionist” view, to borrow the term suggested by Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008), is mostly based on the observation that the bulk of broad-  based 
inequality growth was concentrated in the 1980s. In particular, Card and 
DiNardo (2002) argue that this “episodic” aspect of inequality growth is 
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1. See, in particular, Krueger (1993); Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Autor, Katz, and 
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inconsistent with a simple supply and demand explanation that should 
instead predict an unabated growth in inequality throughout the 1990s. 
The episodic view of inequality changes is corroborated in recent work by 
Lemieux (2006a), who argues that the growth in within-  group inequality is 
also concentrated in the 1980s. This somehow contradicts the earlier work of 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), who document a continuing growth in this 
dimension of inequality throughout the 1970s and 1980s.2 Lemieux (2006a) 
argues that various measurement issues and composition eﬀects account 
for these diﬀerent views about the timing of the growth in within-  group 
inequality.
In response to these recent ﬁ  ndings, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) point 
out that inequality in the upper end of the distribution (top- end inequality) 
has kept growing steadily throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a trend that 
they attribute to relative demand shifts induced by technological change of 
the type proposed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). The steady and 
continuing growth in top-  end inequality has also been well documented by 
Piketty and Saez (2003) using tax data which, unlike data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) or the Census, are not topcoded.
In light of these seemingly diverging views, the main goal of this chapter 
is to identify in the clearest possible way, using CPS data, what have been 
the main changes in inequality and the wage structure since the early 1970s. 
The purpose of this exercise is to establish the basic facts that are robust to 
the variety of measurement problems frequently encountered in the litera-
ture, that is, identify what it is that we really know about changes in wage 
inequality. These measurement problems include topcoding, the growing 
nonresponse to earnings item in the CPS, and diﬀerences in wage measures 
in the March and outgoing rotation group (ORG) supplements of the CPS. 
A ﬁ  rst substantive conclusion of the chapter is that, with the exception of the 
growth in within-  group inequality for men in the 1970s, all the main trends 
appear to be highly robust to these measurement issues. More generally, the 
results conﬁ  rm the view of both the “revisionists,” who ﬁ  nd that changes in 
broad-  based measures of inequality are concentrated in the 1980s, and of 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008), who ﬁ  nd smooth growth in top- end 
inequality.
The related goal of the chapter is to assess what these trends tell us about 
the underlying sources of changes in inequality. I discuss what challenges 
these ﬁ  ndings pose for existing explanations and propose alternative expla-
nations linked to broadly deﬁ  ned wage setting institutions (minimum wage, 
unions, and performance pay) to help reconcile these often contradictory 
sets for facts.
2. Katz and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu (2002) also ﬁ  nd that within-  group inequality kept 
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One diﬀerence between this chapter and most of the existing literature 
is that the majority of basic trends in inequality reported here have been 
adjusted for changes in the skill (experience and education) composition of 
the workforce. A more standard approach is to report basis trends without 
these adjustments for composition eﬀects and then perform decomposi-
tions where composition eﬀects are one of the sources of overall change in 
inequality (see, for example, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993). One drawback 
of these approaches is that what is often presented as the basic inequality 
trends end up mixing up composition eﬀects and true underlying changes in 
the wage structure. Lemieux (2006a) shows this has important consequences 
in the case of within- group, or residual, inequality where composition eﬀects 
are large. Because my goal here is to document the main trends in the wage 
structure, and in summary measures of inequality induced by changes in 
the wage structure, I focus on an approach where composition eﬀects are 
systematically adjusted for.
The wage measure used throughout the chapter is the hourly wage rate 
that purely reﬂ  ects the “price” of diﬀerent types of labor, as opposed to 
earnings that mix up the hourly wage rate with hours decisions. The primary 
source of data used to do so is the 1979 to 2006 ORG supplements of the 
CPS, supplemented with similar wage data from the 1973 to 1978 May CPS. 
All inequality trends are also presented separately for men and women. 
Using hourly wage rates, as opposed to weekly earnings for full- time workers 
(or other earnings measures), is particularly important for women, who are 
less likely to work full-  time and generally exhibit more variation in hours 
of work than men.
Section 1.2 brieﬂ  y discusses the data and presents the measurement 
framework used to compute the various measures of inequality adjusted 
for composition eﬀects. The basic trends are presented in section 1.3, and the 
robustness of these trends to a number of measurement issues is discussed in 
section 1.4. The main ﬁ  ndings are summarized in section 1.5, while section 
1.6 concludes by discussing the implications of these ﬁ  ndings for diﬀerent 
explanations about the sources of change in wage inequality.
1.2      Data and Measurement Framework
1.2.1    Data  Issues
Data issues are discussed in detail in the data appendix, which explains the 
construction of wage measures for the May-  ORG and March CPS Supple-
ments. I only brieﬂ  y discuss how the May and ORG supplements of the 
CPS are processed here. As mentioned in the preceding, the wage measure 
used is the hourly wage rate. The main advantage of this measure is that 
theories of wage determination typically pertain to the hourly wage rate. 20    Thomas  Lemieux
For example, the interplay of demand and supply considerations has direct 
implications for the hourly price of labor. By contrast, the impact of these 
factors on weekly or annual earnings also depends on the responsiveness of 
labor supply to changes in the hourly wage rate.
The Dual Jobs Supplement of the May CPS for 1973 to 1978 asks ques-
tions about wages on the main job held during the survey week to all wage 
and salary workers. For workers paid by the hour, the May CPS asks work-
ers directly about their hourly rate of pay. This is the hourly wage measure 
that I use for this group of workers (about 60 percent of the workforce). For 
the other workers, I compute an hourly wage rate by dividing usual weekly 
earnings by usual weekly hours of work. I use the same procedure for the 
1979 to 1993 ORG supplements that ask the same wage questions as the 
May CPS. The wage questions in the 1994 to 2006 ORG supplements are 
similar except that workers not paid by the hour can choose the periodicity 
at which they report earnings. I compute their hourly wage rate by dividing 
earnings by hours over the corresponding time period. The merged outgo-
ing rotation group (MORG) ﬁ  les combine this information for all twelve 
months of the year.
One important advantage of the MORG supplement is that it is roughly 
three times as large as the May or March supplements of the CPS.3 Another 
advantage over the March CPS is that we know the union status of workers 
in the May- ORG CPS, but not in the March CPS. A potential disadvantage 
is that wage data in the May-  ORG CPS only goes back to 1973, while it is 
possible to go back to the 1960s using the March CPS. This is of little con-
sequence here, however, because most of the relevant movements in wage 
inequality and the wage structure only started in the 1970s.
Unlike in the ORG and March supplements of the CPS, in the 1973 to 
1978 May CPS, wages were not allocated for workers who refused to answer 
the wage questions. To be consistent, I only keep workers with nonallo-
cated wages in the 1979 to 2006 ORG supplements in most of the analysis. 
As a consequence, observations are for 1994 and the ﬁ  rst eight months of 
1995, in which the workers with missing wages are dropped from the sample 
when only nonallocated observations are used. Following most of the lit-
erature, I trim extreme values of wages (less than $1 and more than $100 in 
1979$) and keep workers aged sixteen to sixty-  four with positive potential 
experience.
In the main results presented in the chapter, I adjust for topcoding by 
3. The May 1973 to 1978 and March supplements are administered to all (eight) rotation 
groups of the CPS during these months. By contrast, only one- quarter of respondents (in rota-
tion groups four and eight) are asked the questions from the ORG supplement each month. 
Combining the twelve months of data into a single MORG ﬁ  le yields wage data for twenty- four 
rotation groups compared to eight in the May or March supplements (plus the hispanic and 
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multiplying topcoded earnings by a factor of 1.4. In the case of the March 
CPS, I also compare this rudimentary adjustment to a more sophisticated 
stochastic imputation procedure based on the assumption that top earnings 
follow a Pareto distribution with a parameter estimated separately for each 
year in the tax data of Piketty and Saez (2003).
Finally, I weight all wage observations by hours of work (in addition to 
the usual CPS weights). In the case of the May-  ORG CPS, weekly hours 
of work are used, while annual hours are used for the March CPS. Doing 
so has two main advantages. First, it eﬀectively provides a distribution over 
all hours worked in the economy that do not put excessive focus on workers 
who only supply very few hours to the labor market. For instance, DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) argue that failing to do so would put excessive 
weight on the bottom end of the distribution where many workers around 
the minimum wage provide relatively fewer hours to the labor market than 
most other workers. Another advantage is that weighting by hours of work 
makes the March and May-  ORG wage distributions more directly compa-
rable (Lemieux 2006a).4
1.2.2    Measurement  Model
As discussed earlier, unadjusted trends in wage inequality may either re-
ﬂ  ect underlying changes in the wage structure or composition eﬀects that 
confound the changes in the wage structure. A simple way of adjusting for 
composition eﬀects is to reweight the data so that the distribution of educa-
tion and potential experience remains constant over time (e.g., DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux 1996). Doing so is straightforward in cases where the 
data can be divided up in a ﬁ  nite number of cells. In such cases, the weight 
attached to each cell can be held constant by multiplying the sample fraction 
in year t by the average fraction of observations in this cell for all years com-
bined or for an arbitrary base year. Because results can be sensitive to the 
choice of base year, I follow Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and hold the 
sample composition constant at the average fraction for all years combined. 
One additional reason for using this average weight over all years combined 
is that it yields results similar to those obtained using a more sophisticated 
chain- weighted  approach.5
After various experimentations, I divided the data into 130 cells deﬁ  ned 
on the basis of six education groups (elementary, high school dropouts, high 
4. Abraham, Speltzer, and Steward (1998) also weight by hours for the same reason (i.e., make 
diﬀerent data sources comparable) in their study comparing the evolution of average real wages 
rates from diﬀerent data sources, including the March and May-  ORG CPS.
5. I thank Lawrence Katz for this suggestion. In the case of the within-  group variance dis-
cussed in the following, the change in variance between year t and t –   1 holding the workforce 
composition at its year t –   1 level is Wt,c  Σjk jkt –   1(vjkt –   vjkt –   1). The chain-  weighted composi-
tion adjusted variance in year t, Wt,c, is equal to the base period variance, W0, plus the sum of 
year- to- year  changes  deﬁ  ned in the preceding: Wt,c  W0  Σs1 to t Ws,c.22    Thomas  Lemieux
school graduates, college graduates, and college postgraduates) and twenty- 
two two-  year experience groups.6 The R-  square of a wage regression using 
this set of cell dummies is very close to the R-  square for an unrestricted 
model, and using these broader cells limits the problem of very small cells 
that can generate excessive variability in the reweighting procedure.7
In the ﬁ  rst set of results presented in the chapter, the measure of wage dis-
persion used is the variance of log wages (between and within components) 
as well as standard wage diﬀerentials based on diﬀerences across educa-
tion and experience groups. All these measures can be directly computed as 
functions of the mean and variance of wages in each cell. Let yjkt denote the 
average wage of workers with education j and experience k in year t. The 
variance within this group is vjkt, the share of workers in this group in year t 
is jkt, and the average share over all years is jk. The composition unadjusted 
within-   (Wt,u) and between-  group (Bt,u) variance in year t are
Bt,u  Σjk jkt(yjkt  yt,u)2, and
Wt,u  Σjk jktvjkt,
where yt,u  Σjk jkt yjkt is the unadjusted mean (grand mean) over all groups. 
The corresponding expressions adjusted for composition eﬀects are obtained 
by simply replacing the year t weights, jkt, with the average weights jk:
Bt  Σjk jk(yjkt  yt)2, and
Wt  Σjk jkvjkt,
where yt  Σjk jk yjkt is the composition adjusted mean over all groups.
A standard approach for estimating experience and education wage 
diﬀerentials is to run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. I use a 
slightly diﬀerent approach by computing separate measures of education 
diﬀerentials for each experience category and vice versa. The experience- 
group- speciﬁ  c education wage diﬀerentials are then aggregated up into a 
single diﬀerential by averaging up the experience-  group-  speciﬁ  c education 
diﬀerentials using the average sample fraction in each experience group over 
all years combined.
6. Note that the twenty-  second experience category includes workers with forty-  two years 
and more of potential experience because some of the two- year experience cells with very high 
level of experience (forty- three to forty- four or forty- ﬁ  ve to forty- six) were too small. Note also 
that there are no observations in (a) the cell with the lowest level of education (eight years or 
less) and the lowest level of experience (zero to one years of experience), and (b) the cell with the 
highest level of education (eighteen year or more) and the highest level of experience (forty- two 
years or more of experience) because observations in these cells do not fall into the age range 
(sixteen to sixty- four) used in this paper. This explains why 130, as opposed to 132 (twenty- two 
experience times six education groups) cells are used in the empirical analysis.
7. In the case of men, the average R- square in 1973, 1979, 1989, 1999, and 2006 in the model 
with 120 cells is .3466, compared to .3511 in models with an unrestricted set of experience- 
education dummies based on single years of experience and education. The corresponding 
average R-  square for women are .3110 and .3135, respectively.What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    2 3
Let j represent the fraction of workers (of all experience groups) with 
education j in all years combined, and k represent the fraction of work-
ers (of all education groups) with experience k in all years combined. The 
composition- adjusted  wage  diﬀerential between education group j and j in 
year t is deﬁ  ned as
Dj,jt  Σk k (yjkt  yjkt).
Similarly, the composition-  adjusted wage diﬀerential between experience 
group k and k in year t is
Dk,kt  Σj j (yjkt  yjkt).
One important advantage of the variance as a measure of wage inequality 
is that it can be exactly decomposed as the sum of the between-   and within- 
group components W and B. The decomposition can be directly linked 
to various “price eﬀects” once composition eﬀects have been adjusted for 
using the preceding procedure. Using the terminology of Juhn, Murphy, 
and Pierce (1993), the between-  group component solely reﬂ  ects “observ-
able price eﬀects,” that is, diﬀerences in mean wages among experience and 
education groups. By contrast, the within- group component solely captures 
“unobservable price eﬀects” under the assumption that the distribution 
of unobservables (ability, school quality, etc.) within a ﬁ  xed experience- 
education group does not change over time.
One important disadvantage of the variance, however, is that it is only a 
summary measure of inequality that does not indicate what happens where 
in the distribution. This is a major problem in light of recent evidence that 
inequality is changing very diﬀerently at diﬀerent points of the wage dis-
tribution. A simple and popular way of showing what happens at diﬀerent 
points of the distribution is to look separately at each wage percentile and 
compute summary measures such as the 90-  50 gap (the diﬀerence between 
the 90th percentile and the median of log wages) and the 50-  10 gap (the 
diﬀerence between the median and the 10th percentile of log wages). One 
important drawback of this approach is that these alternative inequality 
measures can no longer be decomposed as the sum of a within-  and between- 
group component that add up to the overall inequality measure. For ex-
ample, the 90- 50 gap is not equal to the sum of the 90- 50 gap in group means 
and the 90-  50 gap in residuals. As a result, it is not completely clear how to 
compute the contribution of observable and unobservable prices to changes 
in the 90-  50 or related gaps.
Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993); Lemieux (2002); and Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney (2005), a number of approaches can nonetheless be used 
to get some indications on the contribution of the various price components 
to changes in inequality at diﬀerent points of the distribution. One approach 
is to look at the distribution of residuals. Consider an individual wage 
observation yijkt. The residual uijkt can be readily computed as the diﬀerence 24    Thomas  Lemieux
between the individual wage observation and the cell mean yjkt so that uijkt  
yijkt –  yjkt.8 Looking at changes in the distribution of residuals provides some 
information on changes in unobservable prices.
Another possible approach is to perform a decomposition in spirit of 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). First remember that the focus here is to 
ﬁ  rst control for composition eﬀects to then see what is explained by changes 
in the wage structure. Adjusting unconditional quantiles for composition 
eﬀects is straightforward in the cell- by- cell case considered here. Observation 
i with education j and experience k in year t can simply be reweighted by the 
factor jk/  jkt so that the distribution of education and experience remains 
constant over time (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Lemieux 2002). 
Changes in observable prices can then be controlled for by replacing the 
actual conditional mean of wages, yjkt, with the average conditional mean 
for the cell over all years combined, yjk. This yields a counterfactual wage 
y ijkt  yijkt  (yjk –   yjkt). Remaining changes in the counterfactual wage y ijkt 
should then only depend on changes in unobservable prices.
1.3      Basic Results from the May-  ORG Data
In this section, I present the basic descriptive facts as well as the decom-
position results using the 1973 to 2006 May-  ORG data. In this ﬁ  rst set of 
results, I only keep observations with unallocated wages and ﬁ  x for topcod-
ing using the 1.4 correction factor. I later discuss in section 1.4 what happens 
when (a) the March CPS is used instead of the May- ORG CPS, (b) allocated 
wage observations are included (for 1979 on), and (c) other assumptions are 
used to deal with topcoding. The results are presented using a set of ﬁ  gures 
and are also summarized in table 1.1. The table shows various measures of 
wage dispersion at ﬁ  ve points of time. At each of these points, three years 
of data are pooled together (1973 to 1975, 1978 to 1980, 1988 to 1990, 1998 
to 2000, and 2004 to 2006) to increase the precision of the results.
1.3.1      Variance over All Experience and Education Groups
The evolution of the overall variance of wages (sum of the between and 
within component) is ﬁ  rst reported in Figure 1.1 for men and women, respec-
tively. A couple of clear patterns emerge from these ﬁ  gures. First, the bulk 
of the growth in the variance is concentrated in the 1980s. Second, adjust-
ing for composition eﬀects noticeably reduces the long-  term growth in the 
variance. In the case of men, the variance is very stable in the 1970s and 
1990s but starts increasing again after 1999. The same pattern can roughly 
8. It is not clear whether the residual should be deﬁ  ned relative to the conditional mean or 
median. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Lemieux (2002) use the conditional mean, while 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) use the conditional median. A few experimentations suggested 
that this choice had little impact on the results.Table 1.1  Summary measures of wage inequality for men and women, May-  outgoing rotation 
group Current Population Survey
Inequality level Inequality change
    1974   1979   1989   1999   2005   1974–1989  1989–2005  1974–2005
A. Men
Unadjusted variance
  Total 0.251 0.250 0.324 0.340 0.359 0.073 0.035 0.108
  Within 0.175 0.173 0.205 0.209 0.218 0.030 0.013 0.044
  Between 0.076 0.077 0.119 0.131 0.141 0.043 0.022 0.065
Adjusted variance
  Total 0.262 0.256 0.328 0.330 0.344 0.066 0.016 0.082
  Within 0.183 0.179 0.206 0.198 0.202 0.024 –0.005 0.019
  Between 0.080 0.076 0.122 0.133 0.143 0.042 0.021 0.063
Other (adjusted) 
inequality measures
  90-  10  gap 1.309 1.285 1.447 1.463 1.498 0.139 0.051 0.190
  50-  10  gap 0.700 0.696 0.732 0.668 0.660 0.032 –0.072 –0.039
  90-  50  gap 0.609 0.590 0.715 0.795 0.838 0.106 0.123 0.229
Education wage gaps
  High  school-  dropout 0.171 0.172 0.218 0.222 0.220 0.047 0.002 0.049
  College-  high  school 0.367 0.320 0.461 0.526 0.548 0.093 0.087 0.181
  Post  graduate-  college –0.007 0.040 0.098 0.193 0.220 0.105 0.122 0.227
Experience wage gap
  20–29  years-  0–9  years 0.390 0.404 0.474 0.399 0.421 0.083 –0.052 0.031
B. Women
Unadjusted variance
  Total 0.189 0.173 0.261 0.285 0.307 0.072 0.046 0.118
  Within 0.137 0.130 0.177 0.180 0.193 0.041 0.016 0.057
  Between 0.052 0.043 0.084 0.105 0.114 0.032 0.030 0.062
Adjusted variance
  Total 0.202 0.183 0.262 0.271 0.287 0.061 0.025 0.086
  Within 0.143 0.137 0.177 0.166 0.172 0.034 –0.004 0.030
  Between 0.059 0.046 0.085 0.105 0.115 0.027 0.030 0.056
Other (adjusted) 
inequality measures
  90-  10  gap 1.069 1.054 1.310 1.315 1.338 0.241 0.028 0.269
  50-  10  gap 0.503 0.465 0.627 0.550 0.559 0.124 –0.068 0.056
  90-  50  gap 0.567 0.589 0.683 0.765 0.779 0.117 0.096 0.213
Education wage gaps
  High  school-  dropout 0.193 0.172 0.244 0.232 0.245 0.051 0.001 0.052
  College-  high  school 0.370 0.320 0.458 0.539 0.560 0.088 0.101 0.189
  Post  graduate-  college 0.189 0.181 0.166 0.230 0.233 –0.023 0.067 0.044
Experience wage gap
  20–29  years-  0–9  years  0.130   0.155  0.264  0.275  0.302  0.134   0.038   0.171
Notes: Inequality measures computed by pooling groups of three years centered on the year listed in the table. 
For example, “1974” corresponds to year 1973 to 1975, and so on. The “adjusted” variance (and other inequal-
ity measures) are adjusted for composition eﬀects using the procedure described in the text.26    Thomas  Lemieux
be observed for women, with the notable diﬀerence that the variance clearly 
declines in the 1970s.
Figure 1.2 presents a ﬁ  rst decomposition by showing separately the evolu-
tion of the between-   and within-  group components of the variance. Three 
interesting patterns emerge from these ﬁ  gures. First, the pattern of change in 
the between-  and within- group components is remarkably similar over time. 
For both men and women, both the within-  and between- group components 
grow sharply in the 1980s, grow less in the 2000s, and remain stable or decline 
(for women in the 1970s) in the 1970s and 1990s. For men, both components 
Fig.  1.1  Total  variance:  A, Men; B, Women
A
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decline slightly in the 1990s once composition eﬀects are adjusted for. For 
women, the 1990s is the only period where the between-   and within-  group 
components move in opposite directions. I argue in the following, however, 
that part of the growth in the between-  group variance for women likely 
captures a diﬀerent type of composition eﬀect linked to the growth in actual 
labor market experience given potential experience. So, on balance, the pat-
tern of change in the within-  and between- group components is very similar.
A second important ﬁ  nding is that, consistent with Lemieux (2006a), 
composition eﬀects account for a very substantial part of the growth in the 
within-  group variance. By contrast, composition eﬀects play little role in 
A
B
Fig. 1.2    Within-   and between-  group variances: A, Men; B, Women28    Thomas  Lemieux
long-  run changes in the between-  group component. This result holds for 
both for men and women. The third ﬁ  nding is that the between-  group com-
ponent accounts for most of the growth in the overall variance, especially 
once composition eﬀects are adjusted for. This particular result is sensitive to 
the data used (March versus May-  ORG CPS) and will be further discussed 
in section 1.4.
I also show in ﬁ  gure 1B.3 (for men) that using a chain- weighted procedure 
(see footnote 5) instead of the ﬁ  xed-  weighted approach used in ﬁ  gures 1.1 
and 1.2 has very little impact on the results. This suggests that using the 
ﬁ  xed-  weighted procedure with average weights computed over the whole 
sample period provides a simple and accurate way of controlling for com-
position eﬀects and is not as arbitrary as using either base-  period or end- 
period weights.9
1.3.2      Relative Wages and Variances by 
Education and Experience Groups
Because the groups (cells) used from the decomposition are solely based 
on education and experience, the source of the growth in the (composition- 
adjusted) between-  group component must either come from a growth in 
education or experience wage diﬀerentials. Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of 
education wage diﬀerentials over time, while ﬁ  gure 1.4 shows the evolution 
of the returns to experience. As is well known, education wage diﬀerentials 
increased for both men and women in the 1980s. Relative to high school 
graduates, panel A of ﬁ  gure 1.3 shows that the wage advantage of men 
with some college or more increased, while the wage disadvantage of high 
school dropouts or those with eight years of education or less (elementary 
category in the ﬁ  gure) also expanded, albeit more modestly. By contrast, 
in the 1990s and 2000s, most education wage diﬀerentials remained stable 
except for college graduates and postgraduates, who kept gaining relative 
to high school graduates.
Looking at the whole 1973 to 2006 period, the striking fact is that most 
of the expansion in wage diﬀerentials has been happening at the top of the 
education distribution. In particular, the gap between college postgraduates 
and high school graduates more than doubled over time. College gradu-
ates and people with some college also experienced substantial gains, while 
relative wages among workers with a high school diploma or less remained 
very stable over time. This mirrors the ﬁ  nding by Lemieux (2006b) of a 
growing convexiﬁ  cation in the relationship between wages and education. In 
other words, wage diﬀerentials at the top end of the education distribution 
have increased steadily over time, while wage diﬀerentials at the bottom end 
remained more or less stable. As I will show in the following, this ﬁ  ts with 
9. The adjustment for composition eﬀects in the within-  group variance are substantially 
larger when base-  period are used instead of end-  period weights (Lemieux 2006a).What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    2 9
the general pattern that inequality has kept growing at the top end but not at 
the low end of the distribution (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005). Note also 
that the results for women in panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.3 are qualitatively similar 
to those for men.
The evolution of experience wage diﬀerentials is shown in ﬁ  gure 1.4. 
Because it would not be very informative to present the diﬀerentials for 
each of the twenty-  one experience groups, I have regrouped the two-  year 
experience groups into in four major experience groups (zero to nine, ten 
to nineteen, twenty to twenty-  nine, and thirty to thirty-  nine years of expe-
rience) by computing a weighted mean of the wages diﬀerentials for the 
Fig. 1.3    Education wage diﬀerentials (relative to high school graduates): A, Men; 
B, Women
A
B30    Thomas  Lemieux
smaller groups. The diﬀerentials reported in the ﬁ  gure show the gap rela-
tive to workers with twenty to twenty-  nine years of experience. Consis-
tent with earlier studies such as Katz and Murphy (1992), there is a clear 
expansion in experience wage diﬀerentials in the 1980s. The diﬀerentials 
start contracting again, however, in the late 1980s, and by the end of the 
sample period, the diﬀerentials are more or less back to their initial 1973 
levels. The situation is quite diﬀerent for women (panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.4). 
Diﬀerentials keep expanding over time except in the late 1990s when inexpe-
rienced (zero to nine years of experience) women gain ground again, prob-
ably because of the very strong labor market at that time. By 2006, the gap 
Fig. 1.4    Experience wages diﬀerentials (relative to 20–  29 years of experience): 
A, Men; B, Women
A
BWhat Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    3 1
between experienced (twenty to twenty-  nine years of experience) and inex-
perienced (zero to nine years of experience) women is three times as large as 
back in 1973 and has almost caught up with the level of the corresponding 
gap for men.
The most plausible explanation for growing experience gaps for women 
is that the large increases in female employment rates have lead to a corre-
sponding increase in the level of actual labor market experience conditional 
on potential experience.10 For instance, women with twenty years of poten-
tial experience now have much more actual experience than they used to. 
As a result, their wage advantage over inexperienced women should have 
increased substantially even if the return to actual experience did not grow 
over time. If actual experience was measured in the CPS, changes in actual 
experience could be corrected for by holding the distribution of education 
and actual (as opposed to potential) experience constant over time. Because 
only potential experience is available in the CPS, the change in experience 
wage diﬀerentials documented in panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.4 should be interpreted 
with caution. Trends in experience diﬀerentials for men are more reliable 
and suggest that “real” returns to experience played little role in the growth 
in wage dispersion.
Taken together, the results in ﬁ  gures 1.2 to 1.4 suggest that, at least for 
men, changes in the between-  group variance induced by growing top-  end 
education wage diﬀerentials account for most of the growth in the vari-
ance of wages, a results also found in more formal decompositions by 
Lemieux (2006b); Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007); and Goldin and 
Katz (2007).
Turning to the within-  group component, ﬁ  gures 1.5 and 1.6 show the 
evolution of the within- group variance by education and experience groups. 
Like the wage diﬀerentials, the within-  group variance by education groups 
are computed as ﬁ  xed-  weighted averages across experience groups and vice 
versa. The within-  group variance for education group j at time t is
Vjt  Σk k vjkt,
while the within-  group variance for experience group k at time t is
Vkt  Σj j vjkt.
As before, the diﬀerent experience groups are combined into four broader 
groups for the ease of exposition.
Figure 1.5 shows that the within-  group variance moves quite diﬀerently 
over time for diﬀerent education groups. Dispersion increases among all 
education groups in the 1980s, keeps growing for the more- educated groups 
(college graduates and postgraduates) after 1990, but remains stable or even 
10. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Blau and Kahn (1996) show that 
actual experience has indeed increased a lot over time for given levels of potential experience.32    Thomas  Lemieux
declines for less-  educated groups. Interestingly, the evolution in within- 
group dispersion closely mirrors the evolution of relative wages by educa-
tion groups, which reinforces the earlier conclusion that inequality growth 
in concentrated at the top end of the distribution.
By contrast, changes in within-  group wage dispersion by experience 
groups are more homogenous across groups. Roughly speaking, the within- 
group variance increases for all experience groups during the 1980s but 
remains more or less constant after 1990. The only exception is inexperi-
enced women for whom the within-  group variance declines after reaching 
a peak in the late 1980s.
A
B
Fig. 1.5    Within-  group variance by education groups: A, Men; B, WomenWhat Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    3 3
Note also that education has a much larger eﬀect on the within-  group 
variance than experience. In ﬁ  gures 1.5 and 1.6, the range of varia-
tion in within-  group variances (in a single year) is about twice as large 
between the lowest and the highest variance groups for education as it 
is for experience. This suggests that secular changes in the distribution 
of education potentially account for more of the composition eﬀects 
than changes in the distribution of experience. Panels A and B of ﬁ  gure 
1B.4 indicate that this is indeed the case and that about two-  thirds of 
A
B
Fig. 1.6    Variance by experience groups: A, Men; B, Women34    Thomas  Lemieux
the composition eﬀects can be linked to changes in the distribution of 
education.11
Taken together, the results in ﬁ  gures 1.2 to 1.6 suggest that changes in the 
relative wages and variances of highly educated workers is a key element in 
the growth of wage inequality since the late 1970s. There is indeed a very 
intriguing parallel between what is happening to the between-   and within- 
group components of wage dispersion. For both components, changes are 
concentrated in the 1980s, and long-  run growth is concentrated among col-
lege graduates and postgraduates. This suggests that both components may 
be reﬂ  ecting the same underlying changes in the labor market, an issue to 
which I return in section 1.6. This also suggests, consistent with Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney (2005), that changes in the top end of the distribution are very 
diﬀerent from changes at the low end. I now explore this issue in more detail 
by looking at what happened at diﬀerent percentiles of the wage distribution.
1.3.3    Changes  at  Diﬀerent Percentiles
Figure 1.7 plots the changes in real wages at each percentile over the 1974 
to 1989, 1989 to 2004, and the whole 1974 to 2004 period. I use ﬁ  fteen- 
year changes for both periods for the sake of comparability and also pool 
three years of data around 1974 (1973 to 1975), 1989 (1988 to 1990), and 
2004 (2003 to 2005) to increase the precision of estimates at each percentile. 
Similar results for wages residuals are presented in ﬁ  gure 1.8. The results 
essentially reproduce the ﬁ  ndings of Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005). The 
main point is that, consistent with Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), wage 
changes are more or less a linear and positively sloped function of percentiles 
during the 1974 to 1989 period, suggesting similar changes in wage disper-
sion at all points of the wage distribution. The situation is radically diﬀerent 
for the 1989 to 2004 period, however. While wage dispersion keeps growing 
above the median, wages become more compressed below the median as real 
wage gains at the bottom end exceed those around the median, a phenomena 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) refer to as the polarization of the labor 
market. Note that this phenomenon can be observed both for wages and 
wage residuals (ﬁ  gure 1.8).
Figure 1.9 then performs a Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) decomposi-
tion on the 90-  50 and 50-  10 gap using the procedure described in section 
1.2. The results are, once again, very similar to those of Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney (2005). Basically, the ﬁ  gures show that at the top end, composition 
eﬀects explain little of the growth in the 90-  50 gap, while prices of observ-
ables account for more than half of the growth in the gap. As shown in the 
preceding, the relevant observable prices that likely account for most of the 
11. The lines labeled “education ﬁ  xed” in panels A and B of ﬁ  gure 1B.4 show what happens 
when the distribution of education is ﬁ  xed to its average value over the whole sample period 
while the distribution of experience conditional on education remains as observed in the data.What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    3 5
growth in the 90- 50 gap are the wage diﬀerentials between college graduates 
and postgraduates relative to high school graduates. The remaining change 
in the 90-  50 gap is due to changes in unobservable prices that are also likely 




Fig. 1.7    Change in real wages by percentile: A, Men; B, Women
12. Using a more sophisticated quantile decomposition, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007) 
indeed ﬁ  nd that education accounts for the bulk of the growth in the 90- 50 gap. Their education 
“eﬀects” include both the between-   and within-  group components.36    Thomas  Lemieux
The situation is very diﬀerent at the lower end of the distribution (50-  10 
gap). Unlike the case of the 90-  50 gap, there are also substantial diﬀerences 
between men and women. I thus discuss these two cases separately. For men, 
the unadjusted 50- 10 gap reported in panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.9 grows in the 1980s 
but more or less returns to its 1970s level by the late 1990s or early 2000s. 
After controlling for composition eﬀects, however, the 50-  10 declines sub-
stantially and is lower in the early 2000s than in the 1970s. While observable 
prices explain a substantial part of the growth in the 1980s and decline in the 
1990s, they have little impact on long-  run changes between 1973 and 2006. 
A
B
Fig. 1.8    Change in wages residuals by percentile: A, Men; B, WomenWhat Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    3 7
The pattern of changes suggests that movements in the return to experi-
ence plays an important role here. The fact that the relative wages of young 
workers fell in the 1980s and went back up in the 1990s likely accounts for 
the swings in the 50-  10 gap because young workers are overrepresented at 
the bottom of the wage distribution. Furthermore, the stability of education 
diﬀerentials at the low end of the education distribution is consistent with 
the lack of observable price eﬀects in the change in the 50-  10 gap. Finally, 
the “residual” explanation for the decline in the 50-  10 after adjusting for 
composition and observable price eﬀects likely has to do with the decline in 
the within-  group variance among less-  educated workers.
A
B
Fig. 1.9    Decomposition of changes in 90-  50 and 50-  10 gaps: A, Decomposition of 
changes in 90-  50 gap, men; B, Decomposition of changes in the 50-  10 gap, men; C, 
Decomposition of changes in 90-  50 gap, women; D, Decomposition of changes in 
50-  10 gap, women38    Thomas  Lemieux
In the case of women, there is a much steeper growth in the 50-  10 gap in 
the 1980s, a phenomena likely linked to the large decline in the real value 
of the minimum wages over this period (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
1996).13 As a result, the 50-  10 gap in the early 2000s remains substantially 
higher than in the 1970s. As in the case of men, composition eﬀects account 
for a substantial part of the growth in the 50-  10 gap. Unlike men, however, 
changes in observable prices also account for a signiﬁ  cant part of the growth 
in the 50- 10 gap, which is consistent with the continuing growth in experience 
wage diﬀerentials documented in panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.4. Remember, however, 
C
D
Fig.  1.9  (cont.)
13. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) ﬁ  nd that over 60 percent of the increase in the 
50-  10 gap between 1979 and 1998 can be accounted for by the decline in the real value of the 
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that composition eﬀects linked to the mismeasurement of actual experience 
likely accounts for much of these changes. By 2006, the 50-  10 gap is a little 
smaller than back in 1973, suggesting that, as in the case of men, changes 
in unobservable prices lead to a small reduction in the 50-  10 gap over time.
1.4      Measurement Issues: What Are the Robust Facts?
All the ﬁ  ndings reported up to now are based on unallocated wage obser-
vations from the May- ORG CPS where topcoding is adjusted for using a 1.4 
imputation factor. I now look at how robust the main results are to these data 
processing assumptions, focusing on trends in the (composition-  adjusted) 
within-   and between-  group variance.
1.4.1    Wage  Allocation
As mentioned in section 1.2, wages were not allocated (imputed) for indi-
viduals who failed to report their wages and earnings in the 1973 to 1978 
CPS. In 1979, the Census Bureau started allocating wages for these individu-
als using the well-  known hot deck matching procedure. Back in 1979, 17.9 
percent of male and 14.8 percent of female workers did not report their 
wages. By 2006, the nonresponse rate had grown to a staggering 35.6 percent 
for male workers and 34.1 percent for female workers. Unless nonresponse is 
completely random, excluding workers with allocated wages could bias the 
trends in wage inequality measures. Of course, correcting for nonresponse is 
not perfect either, as assumptions have to be made about the determinants of 
nonresponse. The standard approach used by the Census Bureau to correct 
for nonresponse is to use a matching procedure where the missing wage is 
replaced with the wage of a “donor” with similar observed characteristics 
(location, education, age, race, etc). Note that this matching or hot decking 
procedure can be thought of as a stochastic imputation procedure. Instead 
of imputing a wage based on a regression model (e.g., Lillard, Smith, and 
Welch 1986), such a matching procedure preserves the wage dispersion con-
ditional on characteristics, which is important when looking at wage disper-
sion, in general, and at within-  group wage dispersion, in particular.
Figure 1.10 shows the diﬀerence in the between-   and within-  group vari-
ances computed with and without allocated wage observations. The series 
with allocated wage observations only starts in 1979 because, as mentioned 
earlier, the Census Bureau did not provide allocated wage observations 
in the 1973 to 1978 May CPS (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004). The main 
message from ﬁ  gure 1.10 is that, fortunately, the trends in wage inequality 
are fairly robust to the treatment of allocated wage observations. For both 
men and women, adding back the allocated wage observations reduces the 
between-  group variance and increases the within-  group variances. In terms 
of trends, however, the only noticeable diﬀerence is that the between-  group 
component grows a little slower over time when allocated wage observations 40    Thomas  Lemieux
are included. Another noticeable diﬀerence is the “blip” in the within- group 
variance in 1994, the year the redesigned and computer-  based CPS was 
introduced. Because allocation ﬂ  ags were not included in the 1994 (and part 
of 1995; see section 1.2) CPS, I computed the 1994 data points in the series 
without allocators as a simple interpolation based on the 1993 and 1995 
numbers. As such, the two series are not comparable for 1994. Because 1994 
seems to be just a one time blip, I did not perform any systematic adjust-
ments to take account of the CPS redesign in 1994.14
A
A
Fig. 1.10    Variance with and without allocated wages controlling for composition 
eﬀects: A, Men; B, Women
14. If anything, the sharp increase in the within-  group variance between 1993 and 1994 
would suggest that the redesign lead to a spurious increase in the within- group variance, which 
reinforces the conclusion that the within-  group variance did not increase after 1990.What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    4 1
1.4.2      Topcoding in the May-  ORG CPS
Figure 1.11 compares the variance with and without the 1.4 topcoding 
adjustment. First notice that, in the case of women (panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.11), 
adjusting for topcoding has essentially no eﬀect on either the between-   or 
the within-  group variance. This is hardly a surprise because only a small 
fraction of women have earnings at or above the topcode.
The adjustment for topcoding has a more noticeable impact in the case 
of men (panel B of ﬁ  gure 1.11). The impact of the increase in the topcode 
in 1986 and 1998 is clearly visible in the case of the within-  group variance, 
where the unadjusted series experience unusual jumps in those two years. 
The impact of the increases in the topcode is also visible in the case of the 
between-  group variance. Generally speaking, the impact of the correction 
for topcoding is larger for the within-   than for the between-  group compo-
nent. Overall, adjusting for topcoding tends to modestly increase the growth 
in inequality over time. This pattern is consistent with the ﬁ  nding of Pik-
etty and Saez (2003) that inequality at the very top end of the distribution 
has increased rapidly since the 1970s. Because an important part of these 
changes are missed because of the topcoding in the CPS, it is natural to 
expect the topcoding adjustment to result in more inequality growth. What 
is not clear, however, is whether a simple and time- invariant adjustment like 
the 1.4 imputation factor adequately captures all of the inequality growth 
at the very top end. I will return to this issue in more detail in the case of the 
March CPS where additional information from the tax data can be used to 
devise a better imputation procedure.
1.4.3      March versus May-  ORG CPS
Diﬀerences in inequality trends in the May- ORG and March supplements 
of the CPS have been well documented by Lemieux (2006a) and Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney (2008). The most striking discrepancy between the series shown 
in ﬁ  gure 1.12 is that the within-  group variance is substantially higher in the 
March than in the May-  ORG supplement of the CPS. Lemieux (2006a) 
shows that this gap mostly reﬂ  ect the fact that wages of workers paid by 
the hour are less precisely measured in the March CPS relative to the May- 
ORG CPS. This particular ﬁ  nding is reproduced in panels A (men) and B 
(women) of ﬁ  gure 1B.1. The problem with the March CPS is that all workers 
are only asked about their annual earnings and hours. An hourly wage is 
then obtained by dividing annual earnings by hours. In the May- ORG CPS, 
however, workers paid by the hour are asked directly about their hourly 
wage rates, which yields a more precise measure of hourly wages than in the 
March CPS (Lemieux 2006a).
Because (classical) measurement error cancels out when wages are aver-
aged out at the cell level, mismeasurement of hourly wages in the March CPS 
should not aﬀect much the between-  group variance. This yields the simple 42    Thomas  Lemieux
prediction, strongly supported by the data in ﬁ  gure 1.12, that the between- 
group variance should be about the same in the March and May- ORG CPS, 
and that the within-  group variance should be larger in the March than in 
the May-  ORG CPS.
A more challenging pattern to explain on the basis of these measure-
ment issues is the fact that the trend growth in the within-  group variance is 
higher in the March than in the May-  ORG CPS. One possible explanation 
suggested by Lemieux (2006a) is that the fraction of workers paid by the 
A
B
Fig.  1.11  Eﬀect of topcoding adjustment, controlling for composition eﬀects: 
A, Men; B, WomenWhat Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    4 3
hour has increased over time (Hamermesh 2002), thereby magnifying the 
mismeasurement problems in the March CPS. As pointed out by Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney (2005), however, this could also bias down the trend in the 
within-  group variance if there is less measurement error in wages of hourly 
than nonhourly paid workers in the May ORG CPS. In any case, Lemieux 
(2006a) also shows, using an error-  components analysis, that changes in 
the fraction of hourly rated workers cannot account for most of the dis-
crepancy between the two series. The evidence rather points out to mea-
surement error (conditional on the hourly pay status) increasing over time 
A
B
Fig. 1.12    Variance in May-  ORG versus March CPS, controlling for composition 
eﬀects: A, Men; B, Women44    Thomas  Lemieux
in the March CPS, though no explicit story is provided for why this may 
be the case.
More important, however, both data sources show that the within-  group 
variance grew much faster before than after the late 1980s, once composition 
eﬀect are controlled for (as they are in ﬁ  gure 1.12). The only diﬀerence is 
that the within-  group variance completely stops growing in the May-  ORG 
CPS, while it grows at a much slower rate in the March CPS. So while the 
two series yield slightly diﬀerent patterns of growth, in both cases the secular 
trends in the within-  group variance closely mirror those observed for the 
between-  group variance, which also grows much more slowly after than 
before the late 1980s. The only case where the two data series clearly diﬀer 
is men in the 1970s. Consistent with Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), the 
within-  group variance for men in the March CPS increases in the 1970s, 
while the between-  group component remains more or less stable during 
this period. This particular series stands out as the only exception where 
inequality grows in the 1970s. By contrast, the within-  group variance for 
women, the within-  group variance for men in the May-  ORG CPS, and 
the between-  group variance all remain stable in the 1970s. This suggests 
that, at a minimum, the growth in the within-  group variance for men in the 
March CPS should be interpreted with caution as it is not a very robust 
ﬁ  nding.
Leaving the 1970s aside, an important point is that, for men, most of 
the growth in the variance of wages between 1980 and 2006 comes from 
the between-   as opposed to the within-  group component. This is similar 
to what was documented earlier using the May-  ORG CPS data. This 
highlights, once again, the importance of the growing education premia 
for college educated workers in the overall growth in wage inequality. For 
women, the growth in the overall variance during this period is, more or 
less, evenly split between the within-   and between-  group components. On 
balance, the earlier results that most of the growth in inequality is due to 
the between-  group component are thus reasonably robust to the choice of 
data set.
1.4.4      Topcoding in the March CPS
Figure 1.13 shows what happens to the within-  and between-  group vari-
ances when (a) topcoding is not corrected for (as was done for the May- ORG 
data), and (b) a more sophisticated imputation procedure is used to allocate 
earnings for topcoded observations. Unlike the May-  ORG CPS, other data 
sources can be used to make reasonable assumptions about the distribution 
of annual earnings above the topcode. In particular, because tax data are 
not topcoded, they provide direct information on the distribution of earn-
ings above the topcode. The usual assumption made is that the upper tail 
of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto distribution. Piketty and Saez 
(2003) use the Pareto distribution to smooth their data on top incomes from What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    4 5
tax data, and I use their implied Pareto parameter for each year to impute 
earnings above the March CPS topcode.15
Another limitation of the standard “ﬁ  xed” imputation procedure based 
on a factor of 1.4 or 1.5 is that it does not preserve the distribution of earn-
ings in the upper tail of the distribution. Intuitively, using a ﬁ  xed as opposed 
to a stochastic imputation procedure likely has little impact for the between- 
A
B
Fig. 1.13    Topcoding adjustments in March CPS, controlling for composition 
eﬀects: A, Men; B, Women
15. I use the updated series available at http:/  /  elsa.berkeley.edu/  ~saez/  TabFig2005s.xls to 
compute the Pareto parameter up to 2005 and then use for 2006 the same parameter as in 2005.46    Thomas  Lemieux
group variance, but it could bias down the within-  group variance by under-
stating wage dispersion among topcoded workers.
Figure 1B.2 shows the topcoding adjustment factors obtained from Pik-
etty and Saez’s (2003) tax data. One very convenient feature of the Pareto 
distribution is that the Pareto parameter, , can be estimated using only 
the value of a topcode yTC, and the mean value for observations above the 










Because we typically work with log wages, it is also convenient to compute 
the mean log value from a Pareto distribution. Another convenient prop-
erty is that when y follows a Pareto distribution with a parameter , then 
log(y/  yTC) follows an exponential distribution with a parameter . The mean 
of log(y/  yTC) is thus 1/  , which implies that






With the standard 1.4 imputation factor, it follows that y  1.4yTC. This 
corresponds to the case of a Pareto distribution with 1/    log(1.4)  
0.336, where the mean value of log(y) from this distribution is imputed to 
all observations. Figure 1B.2 shows that the actual value of 1/   has been 
growing over time as top-  end inequality expanded, though it decreased a 
bit following the end of the high-  tech bubble around 2000. The ﬁ  gure also 
shows another adjustment factor from the March CPS. Since 1995, top-
coded observations in the March CPS have their earnings replaced by the 
average earnings for their relevant (broadly deﬁ  ned) demographic group. 
This is now doable because earnings are no longer topcoded in the CPS 
(computerized) questionnaire, though they are topcoded in public use ﬁ  les. 
The implied Pareto parameter is remarkably similar to the one from the tax 
data, which gives a lot of conﬁ  dence in the imputation procedure based on 
the tax data.16
In practice, I implement the stochastic imputation procedure by randomly 
drawing value z from an exponential distribution (with mean 1) and trans-
forming them into draws from a Pareto distribution by exploiting the link 
between the Pareto and the exponential distribution discussed in the pre-
ceding:17






16. I use the number of married white males, by far the largest group of topcoded workers, 
to compute the Pareto parameter in the CPS.
17. I use a three-  year moving average for the adjustment factor from the tax data to smooth 
for some of the erratic behavior shown in ﬁ  gure 1B.2.What Do We Really Know about Changes in Wage Inequality?    4 7
The results reported in panel A of ﬁ  gure 1.13 for men show that using 
either the 1.4 ﬁ  xed imputation factor or the stochastic imputation proce-
dure yield very similar estimates of the between-  group variance. As in the 
case of the May-  ORG, failing to adjust for topcoding slightly biases down 
the secular growth in the between-  group variance, but the overall impact is 
very small.
Turning to the within-  group variance, the ﬁ  xed and stochastic imputa-
tion procedures yield, perhaps surprisingly, fairly similar results. In fact, the 
change in the within- group variance between 1973 and 2006 is essential iden-
tical under the two imputation procedures. One small diﬀerence is that the 
stochastic imputation procedure tends to produce a larger variance from 
the mid-  1980s to the late 1990s, which slightly accentuates the slowdown 
in the growth in the within-  group variance after the late 1980s. Another 
diﬀerence is that the within-  group variance obtained using the stochastic 
imputation procedure does not change when the topcode is raised in 1995 
and 2002. By contrast, the within-  group variance computed with the ﬁ  xed 
1.4 correction jumps almost as much as the uncorrected series in these two 
years. This suggests that the stochastic imputation procedure does generally 
a better job at correcting for topcoding and that year-  to-  year changes are 
better measured using this procedure instead of the ﬁ  xed imputation proce-
dure. In terms of general inequality trends, however, panel A of ﬁ  gure 1.13 
suggests that the two topcoding adjustments produce very similar results. 
Because the topcode has been gradually increased over time, even the unad-
justed series more or less capture the correct long-  run trends, though year- 
to- year variations are highly sensitive to changes in the value of the topcode.
1.5      Changes in Wage Inequality: A Summary
The last two sections have shown that there are a number of clear pat-
terns of changes in wage inequality and in the wage structure that are highly 
robust to measurement issues. The only notable exception has to do with 
changes in within-  group wage inequality for men in the 1970s, where the 
March and May- ORG supplements of the CPS yield substantially diﬀerent 
answers. I will underplay this particular aspect of inequality changes in 
this section but discuss its implication for the interpretation of inequality 
changes in the next section.
The main results about “what we really know” about changes in wage 
inequality can be summarized as follows. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
results are based on inequality measures adjusted for composition eﬀects:
1.  Changes in broad-  based measures of inequality, such as the variance, 
are concentrated in the 1980s. This holds for both the between-   and within- 
group components of wage dispersion.
2. Trends in broad-  based measures of inequality hide important 48    Thomas  Lemieux
diﬀerences at diﬀerent points of the distribution. At the top end of the dis-
tribution, inequality has grown steadily throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. At the low end of the distribution, inequality only grew in the 1980s 
and remained constant or declined during the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.
3.  The pattern of change in inequality across education groups is highly 
consistent with the broader changes at the top end and low end of the dis-
tribution. Mean wages of college graduates and postgraduates increased 
steadily relative to high school graduates, though the growth in more marked 
in the 1980s. Similarly, the within-  group variance of these two highly edu-
cated groups has grown steadily over time. By contrast, the wage disadvan-
tage of workers without a high school degree relative to those with a high 
school degree only increased (by a small amount) in the 1980s. The within- 
group variance for workers with a high school degree or less increased a bit 
in the 1980s but then remained stable or declined in the 1990s and 2000s.
4.  Experience wage diﬀerentials go up and down over time but contribute 
little to long-  run changes in wage inequality. These diﬀerentials increase 
more for women, but this likely reﬂ  ects spurious changes linked to the chang-
ing relationship between actual and potential experience.
These main changes are also summarized in table 1.1, which shows the evo-
lution in the diﬀerent measures of wage inequality over the 1973 to 2006 
period. While all the ﬁ  ndings reported in the table can also be seen in the 
various ﬁ  gures, it is clear from the table that the growth in inequality is con-
centrated in the upper end of the distribution and in the 1980s.
1.6      Possible Explanations: Some Concluding Comments
Looking back at explanations for inequality growth suggested ﬁ  fteen 
years ago, the new developments documented in the preceding pose a 
major challenge to the view based on a general increase in the demand for 
all dimensions of skill. A ﬁ  rst puzzle is that if relative demand for skilled 
workers kept going up over the last ﬁ  fteen years, how can one explain 
the decline in the returns to experience over this period or the stability 
of the skill premium between high school graduates and less-  educated 
workers?
In the case of the return to experience, a possible answer is that rela-
tive supply, as opposed to relative demand, is the key factor behind secu-
lar changes in this wage diﬀerential. Just like the entry of baby boomers 
ﬁ  rst depressed the wages of young workers in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Welch 1979), as this cohort ages, the negative pressure of supply on wages 
is increasingly moving to the upper end of the experience distribution, which 
reduces the experience premium. While this hypothesis should be probed in 
more detail, it is also reasonable to expect that relative demand pressures are 
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sensible to think that the computer and information technology revolution 
is “education-  biased,” it is far from clear that it is also “experience-  biased.” 
This suggests that the growth in both education and experience diﬀerentials 
in the early 1980s may simply be a coincidence linked to demand factors 
driving the growth in the education premium and supply considerations 
driving the growth in the experience premium.
This view that the 1980s was a “perfect storm” where diﬀerent factors 
resulted in an expansion in inequality at diﬀerent points of the distribution, 
as opposed to a ubiquitous increase in the demand for skill, can also help 
shed light on some other puzzles. For instance, the large decline in the real 
value of the minimum wage during the 1980s helps explain why low-  end 
inequality increased sharply during this period but not in other periods. 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999) ﬁ  nd that most of the 
growth in the 50- 10 gap in the 1980s was due to the minimum wage (all of the 
change in Lee 1999). After adjusting for this factor, the remaining changes 
in 1980s were, thus, concentrated at the top end of the distribution.
Once several explanations are allowed to aﬀect inequality at diﬀerent 
points of the wage distribution, it becomes simpler to think of possible 
explanations for the secular growth in top-  end inequality, without requir-
ing these explanations to also account for swings in inequality growth at 
the bottom end. Because the growth in inequality at the top end of the 
distribution has attracted a lot of attention in recent years, a number of 
candidate explanations are available in the literature. For instance, Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney (2006) use Autor, Levy, and Murnane’s (2003) model of 
technological change to explain why the labor market became polarized in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The model is based on a distinction between skilled and 
routine tasks where computers are substitutes for the latter. In this model, 
the introduction of computer technologies depresses the middle of the dis-
tribution where workers perform skilled but routine tasks, which results in 
increasing inequality at the top end but decreasing inequality at the low 
end. Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007) show that continuing deunioniza-
tion yields similar predictions. Another possible explanation for the grow-
ing inequality at the top end includes the growth in pay for performance 
(Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent 2007). None of these three explanations 
can account very well, however, for why inequality at the low end increased 
in the 1980s and decreased later, which highlights the value of combining 
these explanations with changes in the minimum wage.
Another important ﬁ  nding presented here that does not sit well with expla-
nations suggested ﬁ  fteen years ago is the fact that within-  group inequality 
does not play as an important role in inequality changes as was thought 
back then. Note, however, that the basic insight of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1993) that changes in the between-  and within- group components are driven 
by similar factors remains consistent with more recent developments. For 
example, the fact that both the relative wages and the within-  group disper-50    Thomas  Lemieux
sion of highly educated workers grew over time suggests that these develop-
ments are closely linked. Lemieux (2006b) shows that this follows naturally 
in a model with heterogenous returns to skill where the demand for college 
education increases. The fact that trends in the overall within-  and between- 
group inequality are similar over time also points out to similar factors 
explaining both phenomena.
The one ﬁ  nding of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) that is much less clear 
now than ﬁ  fteen years ago is related to changes in within- group inequality in 
the 1970s. Using March CPS data, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) argue 
that the growth in the within- group inequality in the 1970s provides evidence 
that relative demand was already increasing in the 1970s. As shown earlier, 
this last conclusion did not turn out to be very robust. This being said, 
whether within- group inequality increased in the 1970s does not play a cru-
cial role in understanding why inequality has been changing over time. For 
both theoretical and empirical reasons, it is more appropriate to try to under-
stand what drives changes in returns to education instead of within-  group 
inequality over time. On the empirical side, the evidence presented in this 
paper shows that the basic facts about returns to education are very robust 
to measurement issues, which is not the case for within-  group inequality. 
On the theoretical side, the basic idea of a race between relative supply and 
demand can be tested in the case of education, while the relative supply of 
unobserved skills underlying within-  group dispersion is a fairly nebulous 
concept.
In terms of potential for future research, arguably the most important 
fact documented in this chapter and in related work (Lemieux 2006b; 
Goldin and Katz 2007) is the dramatic importance of education in changes 
in wage inequality. Fifteen years ago, most observers would probably not 
have thought that education could play such an important role in inequality 
growth. After all, the R-  square of wage equations in the CPS are typically 
in the .3 to .4 range, with only part of the explanation coming from educa-
tion. Furthermore, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) had shown that most 
of the growth in wage inequality in the March CPS was coming from the 
within-  group component, which was not surprising given the low R- square 
of wage regressions.
As I have shown in this chapter, however, the dominant source of long- 
run growth in the between- group component is the growth in relative wages 
of college-  educated workers, while the dominant source of growth in the 
within-  group component is the increase in within-  group inequality among 
the same workers. These two related facts also help explain why inequal-
ity has mostly increased in the top end of the distribution where these 
workers are concentrated, as opposed to the low end of the distribution. 
In retrospect, this is a fairly unexpected development that deserves further 
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Data Appendix A
May-  ORG and March CPS Data
This appendix explains in more detail how the March and May-  ORG CPS 
are processed to make the wage samples as comparable as possible. It closely 
follows the data appendix in Lemieux (2006a). Both the May-  ORG and the 
March CPS can be used to compute hourly wage rates. The March Supple-
ment of the CPS asks about total earnings during the previous year. An 
hourly wage rate can then be computed by dividing last year’s earnings by 
total hours worked last year. The latter variable is computed by multiplying 
two other variables available in the March CPS, usual weekly hours of work 
last year and weeks worked last year.
I limit the analysis of wages in the March CPS to the period starting with 
the earnings year 1975 (March 1976 survey) because an hourly wage rate 
cannot be computed in earlier years. Another reason for starting with the 
wage data for 1975 is that the other wage measure available in the May- ORG 
CPS is only available from May 1973 on. Because one contribution of the 
chapter is to compare the two data sources, the gain of using a more precise 
and comparable measure of hourly wages from the March CPS clearly out-
weighs the cost of losing two years of data for 1973 and 1974.
There are important diﬀerences between the way wages are measured 
in the March and May-  ORG CPS. First, while the March CPS asks about 
retrospective measures of wages and earnings (last year), the May-  ORG 
supplement asks about wages at the time of the survey. Second, the May- 
ORG wage questions are only asked to wage and salary workers. To get 
comparable wage samples, I limit my analysis of the March data to wage 
and salary earnings. One problem is that when workers have both wage and 
salary and self-  employment earnings, we do not know how many hours of 
work pertain to wage and salary jobs versus self-  employment. To minimize 
the impact of these considerations, I limit my analysis to wage and salary 
workers with very limited self- employment earnings (less than 10 percent of 
wage and salary earnings).
Another diﬀerence is that the ORG supplement only asks questions about 
the worker’s main job (at a point in time), while the March CPS includes 
earnings from all jobs, including second jobs for dual job holders. Fortu-
nately, only a small fraction of workers (around 5 percent typically) hold 
more than one job at the same time. Furthermore, these secondary jobs 
represent an even smaller fraction of hours worked.
Finally, because the May- ORG CPS is a “point- in- time” survey, the prob-
ability that an individual’s wage is collected depends on the number of weeks 
worked during a year. By contrast, a wage rate can be constructed from the 
March wage information irrespective of how many weeks (provided that it 
is not zero) are worked during the year. This means that the May- ORG wage 52    Thomas  Lemieux
observations are implicitly weighted by the number of weeks worked, while 
the March wage observations are not.
One related issue is that several papers like DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
(1996) also weight the observations by weekly hours of work to get a wage 
distribution representative over the total number of hours worked in the 
economy. Weighting by weekly hours can also be viewed as a reasonable 
compromise between looking at full-  time workers only (weight of one for 
full-  time workers, zero for part-  time workers) and looking at all workers as 
“equal” observations irrespective of the number of hours worked. Through-
out the chapter, I thus weight the March CPS observations by annual hours 
of work and weight the May-  ORG observations by weekly hours of work.
In both the March and ORG supplements of the CPS, the Census Bureau 
allocates a wage or earnings item for these workers using an “hot deck” 
procedure. The CPS also provides ﬂ  ags and related sources of information 
that can be used to identify workers with allocated wages in all years except 
in the January 1994 to August 1995 ORG supplements.18 By contrast, in the 
May 1973 to 1978 CPS, wages were not allocated for workers who failed to 
answer wage and earnings questions. For the sake of consistency across data 
sources, all results presented in the chapter only rely on observations with 
nonallocated wages, unless otherwise indicated.
Wages and earnings measures are topcoded in both the March and May- 
ORG CPS. Topcoding is not much of an issue for workers paid by the hour 
in the May- ORG CPS. Throughout the sample period, the topcode remains 
constant at $99.99, and only a handful of workers have their wage censored 
at this value. By contrast, a substantial number of workers in the March 
CPS, and nonhourly workers in the May-  ORG CPS, have topcoded wages. 
When translated on a weekly basis for full-  year workers, the value of the 
topcode for annual wages in the March CPS tends to be comparable to the 
value of the topcode for weekly wages in the May-  ORG CPS. For instance, 
in the ﬁ  rst sample years (1975 to 1980), the weekly topcode in the May- 
ORG CPS is $999 compared to $962 for full- year workers in the March CPS 
(annual topcode of $50,000). Toward the end of the sample period (1998 to 
2002), the weekly topcode in the ORG CPS is $2,884, which is identical to 
the implied weekly topcode for full- year workers in the March CPS (annual 
topcode of $150,000 divided by 52). As discussed in the chapter, I adjust 
for topcoding in both the May-  ORG and the March CPS by multiplying 
topcoded wages by a factor 1.4.
Several further data adjustments are also performed before applying the 
1.4 factor to topcoded wages. In the May-  ORG CPS, the topcode on the 
edited weekly earnings variable for workers not paid by the hour goes from 
18. Allocation ﬂ  ags are incorrect in the 1989 to 1993 ORG CPS and fail to identify most 
workers with missing wages. Fortunately, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) ﬁ  les report 
both edited (allocated) and unedited (unallocated) measures of wages and earnings. I use this 
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$999 in 1973 to 1988, to $1,923 in 1989 to 1997, and to $2,884 in 1998 to 
2006. Between 1986 and 1988, however, it is possible to use the unedited 
weekly earnings variable that is topcoded at $1,999 instead of $999. Though 
the unedited variable is not computed for workers who fail to respond to the 
earnings question, this does not matter here because I focus on workers with 
unallocated wages and earnings. I thus use the unedited earnings variable 
for the 1986 to 1988 period.
Several adjustments also have to be performed before applying the 1.4 
factor to the March CPS data. Until March 1989, wages and salaries were 
collected in a single variable pertaining to all jobs, with a topcode at $50,000 
until 1981 (survey year), $75,000 from 1982 to 1984, and $99,999 from 1985 
to 1988. Beginning in 1989, the March CPS started collecting wage and sal-
ary information separately for main jobs and other jobs, with topcodes at 
$99,999 for each of these two variables. The topcodes were later revised to 
$150,000 for the main job and $25,000 for other jobs in March 1996, and to 
$200,000 for the main job and $35,000 for other jobs in March 2003.
Prior to March 1996, the earnings variable of workers who are topcoded 
simply takes the value of the actual topcode. Starting in March 1996, how-
ever, the value of earnings for topcoded workers is replaced by the mean 
earnings among all topcoded workers. Mean earnings are separately com-
puted for diﬀerent demographic groups. To maintain consistency over time, 
I ﬁ  rst construct a topcoded variable for total wage and salary earnings from 
March 1989 on. For 1989 to 1995, I simply keep the pre-  1989 $99,999 top-
code. Because both main job and other job earnings are separately topcoded 
at $99,999, I simply add these two earnings variables and topcode the sum at 
$99,999. After various experiments, I decided to use a topcode of $150,000 
for total wage and salary earnings from 1996 on. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to topcode total wage and salary earnings in a way that is com-
pletely consistent with the pre-  1996 situation. The problem is with workers 
who earn less that $125,000 on their main job but have earnings from other 
jobs topcoded at $25,000. It is not possible to know whether total earnings 
of these workers are above or below $150,000. After some experiments, I 
decided to compute total earnings as the sum of main job earnings (censored 
at $150,000) and earnings on other jobs where I use the actual earnings 
provided in the CPS (where topcoded observations are imputed the actual 
mean earnings among topcoded workers).
These adjustments likely have little impact because, in the March 1996 
to 2007 CPS, less than 1 percent of workers have main job earnings below 
$125,000 and are topcoded on their other jobs earnings. Finally, once total 
wage and salary earnings have been censored in a consistent fashion, I mul-
tiply the earnings of workers at this consistent topcode by the standard 1.4 
factor. I also follow the existing literature by trimming very small and very 
large value of wages to remove potential outliers (less than $1 or more than 54    Thomas  Lemieux
$100 in 1979 dollars) and limit the analysis to workers aged sixteen to sixty- 
four with positive potential experience (age-  education-  6).
One last point about the ORG CPS is that, starting in 1994, workers are 
ﬁ  rst asked what is the earnings periodicity (hourly, weekly, biweekly, annual, 
etc.) that they prefer to use in reporting their earnings on their current job. 
But as before, all workers paid by the hour are asked for their hourly wage 
rate. Hourly rated workers are asked this question even if “hourly” is not 
their preferred periodicity in the ﬁ  rst question. Workers not paid by the hour 
are then asked to report their earnings for the periodicity of their choice. An 
hourly wage rate can again be computed by dividing earnings by usual hours 
of work over the relevant period. In 1994, the CPS also introduced “variables 
hours” as a possible answer for usual hours of work. I impute hours of work 
for these workers using a procedure suggested by Anne Polivka of the BLS.Appendix B
A
B
Fig. 1B.1    Variance of log hourly wages with both May-  ORG and March wages 
(matched sample): A, Men; B, WomenFig. 1B.2    Topcoding adjustment factor (1/  ) log annual earnings
Fig. 1B.3    Comparing chain-  weighted and ﬁ   x- weighted  composition- adjusted 
variances, MenA
B
Fig. 1B.4    Role of education and experience in composition eﬀects in the within- 
group variance: A, Men; B, Women58    Thomas  Lemieux
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Comment  Lawrence F. Katz
Thomas Lemieux has produced a terriﬁ  c chapter documenting the basic 
facts about changes in the U.S. hourly wage structure over the past three 
decades using the May-  outgoing rotation group (ORG) and March Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) data. He also does a very nice job of examin-
ing how conclusions about wage inequality trends are aﬀected by diﬀerent 
choices for handling crucial measurement issues related to the topcoding of 
high earnings, the treatment of imputed (allocated) earnings observations, 
adjustments for changes in the education and experience composition of the 
workforce, and whether to use direct point-  in-  time wage measures from the 
May-  ORG CPS versus wage measures based on past year annual earnings, 
weeks worked, and usual hours worked from the March CPS.
Lemieux carefully documents large increases in overall hourly wage 
inequality (as measured by the variance or 90- 10 log wage gap) for both men 
and women since 1980. He shows that overall wage inequality grew most rap-
idly in the 1980s when both upper-  end (90-  50) and lower-  end (50-  10) wage 
inequality increased. But lower-  end wage inequality stopped increasing 
(and even decreased after adjusting for education-  experience composition 
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